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Abstract—This paper describes one of the essential elements
of Secure Workstation for Special Applications (SWSA) to
cryptographic protection of removable storage devices with
USB interface. SWSA is a system designed to process data
classified to different security domains in which the multi-
level security is used. The described method for protecting
data on removable Flash RAM protects data against unau-
thorized access in systems processing the data, belonging to
different security domains (with different classification levels)
in which channel the flow of data must be strictly controlled.
Only user authenticated by the SWSA can use the removable
medium in the system, and the data stored on such media
can be read only by an authorized user by the SWSA. This
solution uses both symmetric and asymmetric encryption al-
gorithms. The following procedures are presented: creating
protected a file (encryption), generating signatures for the file
and reading (decryption) the file. Selected elements of the pro-
tection systems implementation of removable Flash RAM and
the mechanisms used in implementation the Windows have
been described.
Keywords—filter driver, removable media protection, symmetric
and asymmetric encryption.
1. Introduction
Nowadays, the most comfortable Removable large-capacity
data devices are connected to the system via the bus Univer-
sal Serial Bus (USB). Such devices include ﬂash memory
RAM with a capacity of several tens of GB and hard disk
drives with a capacity of several TB. The popularity of
these devices forces the need for mechanisms to ensure an
adequate level of protection of data stored on them. This
is important in the case of sensitive data which have a sig-
niﬁcant impact on the safety of the institution. This fact
is particularly important in the systems where conﬁdential
data are processed. It is hard to imagine a contemporary
computer system in which the data storage devices cooper-
ating with the system through the USB bus are not avail-
able. This observation also applies to Secure Workstation
for Special Applications1 (SWSA) [1], [2].
1SWSA is a computer system in which multi-level protection mecha-
nisms have been implemented. In this system, the stored and processed
data (objects) are classiﬁed due to the required level of security. Users of
the system (subjects) have speciﬁc authorization to work with classiﬁed
data. In order to ensure conﬁdentiality and integrity of data for subjects
are used mechanisms of mandatory access control to objects.
In ordinary systems to protect data on the media Flash
RAM, the most commonly used software (e.g., USB Flash
Security, Secure Traveler, Rohos Mini Drive, etc.) must be
installed on the media prior to its use. During the installa-
tion of such software, in Flash RAM is created an encrypted
volume which is accessed by using then deﬁned password.
The power of safeguard of the medium using this type of
software depends on the used symmetric encryption algo-
rithm and key length. This type of security is suﬃcient
in the case of a loss or theft of the media. The use of
such solutions in systems with multilevel security (MLS)
which include the SWSA is insuﬃcient for the following
reasons:
– system does not provide the possibility of the control
of an access to data copied to such a secured remov-
able media, in particular, an entity with the lower
clause cannot be blocked by system, while trying to
read to the data with a higher classiﬁcation contained
on the medium;
– transfer of data between diﬀerent entities that use
such media possesses problems arising mainly from
the need to provide the transfer of the medium and
an encryption key with help which the medium has
been encrypted;
– entity that creates a copy of the data on the media
does not assure that the data are only available for the
appropriate recipient and the recipient does not have
an assurance that data is received from the expected
sender.
The article presents a solution enabling to such a prepa-
ration of data stored in Flash RAM, so that the recording
medium can be used to secure the transfer of data ﬁles,
during which the sender of data (i.e., the creator of the pro-
tected media content) is assured that data will be available
only for designated recipient, and the recipient is assured
that the received data comes from the expected sender. The
described mechanism uses both symmetric and asymmet-
ric encryption algorithms and asymmetric. The presented
solution uses a ﬁlter driver [3]–[5].
In this solution, it is assumed that in terms of operating
system data can be processed in two directions: from plain
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Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of securing data stored on removable media.
text form stored on your hard disk to secure form on re-
movable media (e.g., Flash RAM, hard drive) connected to
the system via the USB bus and, conversely, from secure
form on removable media to plain text form on the hard
drive. Do not allow the possibility of using the software
for the direct exchange of data ﬁles between removable
media (e.g., ﬂash memory) connected to the system via
the USB bus.
The process of securing the data exchange using remov-
able media should satisfy the following functional require-
ments:
– it should be implemented in a manner transparent to
the user,
– it should not cause any noticeable loads of the oper-
ating system to the user,
– it should not have a signiﬁcant impact on the speed
of read and write data onto data media,
– it should allow the use of various encryption algo-
rithms to ensure the required level of conﬁdentiality,
– it should be built on removable media, protected ﬁle
and the signature for this ﬁle (signature should con-
tain securely stored data necessary to encrypt/decrypt
the protected ﬁle, and to ensure the integrity of the
ﬁle,
– it should allow to perform any operation allowed for
data storage media, such as volume, surface checking
for errors, and defragment the disk-based data.
These requirements force the use of the process of secur-
ing the data separate modules (drivers), operating at the
kernel-level of operating system [4]–[7]. Schematic repre-
sentation of a solution being developed in the environment
of Windows systems family is shown in Fig. 1.
Described solution is available for a user of the secure work-
station through the control application (CApp). The main
elements of the built system are interacting drivers: encryp-
tion driver [3] and driver supporting, which are compatible
to the Windows Driver Model [6]. Both elements work in
kernel mode, operating system and communicate with each
other using the internal mechanisms of the operating sys-
tem (in the ﬁgure they are labeled as IRP) [6], [8]. These
mechanisms are described in details in Section 2.
The purpose of the encryption driver (EnD) is the realiza-
tion of the process of encryption/decryption of data and
determination of its hash value for these data. The driver
supporting (DSu) sets the signature for protected data (ac-
cording to the algorithm presented in Section 3) and medi-
ates the transfer of messages/commands between EnD and
CApp. The other components of the system are: the .DLL
library that provides the functionality of the implemented
encryption algorithms, module of generation of session key,
and the database of public keys of users.
The product of the process securing the original ﬁle con-
sists of two ﬁles: a ﬁle with encrypted data and the ﬁle
containing the signature for the encrypted ﬁle. Both ﬁles
can be stored on one medium or each ﬁle on a separate
medium. Choosing a storage location of the signature ﬁle
is deﬁned by the user through CApp. It should be noted
that saving the encrypted ﬁle and the signature ﬁle on sep-
arate media increases the security of stored data, but it is
inconvenient to use.
2. Filter Drivers in Windows
Construction of Class Windows operating system assumes
the use of two modes: user mode and kernel mode [6], [8].
Architecture of such a system is shown in Fig. 1. Modular
design allows for an easy expansion of system functions
(which is clearly visible in Fig. 2, showing the components
operating in kernel mode), while the use of hardware ab-
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Fig. 2. Architecture of operating systems Windows [6].
Fig. 3. Process of communication between user application and
the driver [6].
straction layer (HAL) provides portability between diﬀerent
hardware architectures.
From the point of view the task of securing the content of
removable storage media in the SWSA and the drivers of
these devices (in the part relating to user mode) are relevant
only the following components:
– user application (the CApp in the solution which is
presented in this paper);
– Environment Subsystem (Windows);
– ntdll.dll system library that allows a communication
with the elements working in kernel mode.
Environment subsystems form a working environment for
applications running on them. It translates the application
call to the system and its resources to the primary functions
of Windows. The process of communication between user
application and driver uses packets IRP that are created
Fig. 4. Windows Driver Model [6].
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by the I/O Manager on the basis of the generated request
type. The process of handling requests from the user’s ap-
plication in which the IRP packet is generated is shown
in Fig. 3.
The Windows Driver Model assumes that the devices are
controlled by a stack of drivers working together, each of
which is responsible for the implementation of other tasks
of the device. The driver stack model is shown in Fig. 4.
In this model, there are always two drivers: a bus driver at
the bottom of the stack and the functional driver which de-
ﬁnes the utility functions of the device. The model allows
for the possibility of using additional ﬁlter drivers that are
placed in the stack and allow you to monitor and modify
the contents of packages I/O requests directed to device.
DEVICE OBJECT is a representative of a particular de-
vice, such as ﬂash RAM, and is associated with a driver
(DRIVER OBJECT) that supports it.
Driver objects are created by the I/O Manager when the
driver is loaded. Drivers are responsible for creation of
Fig. 5. Objects stack for the storage device connected to the
system via the USB [3].
Fig. 6. The drivers stack for data storage devices using mecha-
nisms of Filter Manager [4].
the DEVICE OBJECT representing the system devices.
Creating an object of this type occurs when the AddDe-
vice procedure is called by the I/O Manager. Depending
on the role of the driver, created object can represent:
– Physical Device Object (PDO) – representing the
connection between the device and the bus;
– Functional Device Object (FDO) – functional driver
uses it to determine functions of the device;
– Filter Device Object (FiDO) – ﬁlter driver uses it
to process data from the packet I/O requests, and
in particular their encryption, which is used in the
described solution.
The I/O Manager can start sending packets I/O requests to
the supported device after all DEVICE OBJECT objects
will be created.
Implementation of the described drivers model for the stor-
age device connected to the system via the USB bus is
more complex. Figure 5 shows objects stack associated with
drivers of such a device. The presented diagram shows
that on the top of the objects stack there is an object of
ﬁlters manager. Below are the objects corresponding to
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the FAT32 ﬁle system (marked on the diagram as an object
of type FS). An attention should be paid to the ﬁle system
drivers that are not explicitly included in the driver stack.
The association between driver of ﬁle system FS and object
representing a partition in the storage device is executed by
a data structure Volume Parameters Block (VPB).
The presented solution uses a kernel component called the
Filter Manager. Filter Manager performs a signiﬁcant part
of the tasks. Otherwise it would have to be performed
by the ﬁlter drivers. As a result, using the ﬁlter manager
(called mini-ﬁlters) is simpler and easier to implement. Fil-
ter Manager is available in all systems ranging from Win-
dows Server 2003 to Windows XP with Service Pack 2.
Figure 6 shows the drivers stack for data storage devices
using mechanisms of Filter Manager.
3. The Process of Creating and Reading
a Protected File
In the process of creating a protected ﬁle on removable
ﬂash memory (that is a creating an encrypted ﬁle and the
signature of this ﬁle), and reading (decrypting) the ﬁle from
the removable ﬂash memory are the necessary attributes of
the user who created the protected ﬁle (this user will be
called the sender), and user for whom the protected ﬁle
was created (this user will be called the recipient). When
creating a protected ﬁle, sender is role plays a user logged
into the system and he speciﬁes a ﬁle recipient using CApp
(you can select one from among the users who meet the
requirements of SWSA closely related to the multilevel se-
curity of system). When reading a protected ﬁle with the
use of CApp, the logged user plays the recipient role, and
the sender attributes are read from signature ﬁle after the
successful decryption of this ﬁle, using the private key of
the logged on user. Permissible is a situation in which the
logged user is simultaneously the sender and the recipient
of data.
The process of creating a protected ﬁle includes the step
of encryption, and then creating a signature for that ﬁle.
However, during the process of reading a protected ﬁle in
a ﬁrst step, the attributes needed for decrypting this ﬁle are
obtained from the signature. In the second step, the ﬁle is
decrypted.
3.1. Creating a Protected File
The process of writing the ﬁle, including ﬁle encryption
and hash generation is performed by the EnD. Operation
of EnD has been presented in [3]. The diagram describing
the process of writing the ﬁle is shown in Fig. 7. Dashed
line in that ﬁgure indicates operations implemented by the
EnD. During the process of ﬁle encryption, the value of
the hash function is determined to ensure the integrity of
the ﬁle.
Fig. 7. The process of writing data to removable ﬂash memory.
The determined value of the hash function and the gener-
ated session key after completion of record are transferred
to the DSu in order to generate a signature for the stored
data. The process transferring of the hash function value
and the session key transferring is implemented using the
system mechanisms marked in Fig. 7, as the IRP.
Fig. 8. The algorithm of signature generation for protected ﬁle.
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3.2. Determining the Signature
For each of the protected ﬁle the signature is generated
which contains the information needed to read this ﬁle.
Signature of the ﬁle contains the following ﬁelds:
– SeK – random key to encrypt/decrypt the secure ﬁle,
– HASH – value of hash function which is determined
on the basis on the content of protected ﬁle after
encrypting this ﬁle,
– H ID – identiﬁer of the algorithm used to generate
the hash,
– En ID – identiﬁer of the algorithm used to encrypt-
ing,
– O ID – identiﬁer of the logged user (the sender) who
initiated the operation of data write – this identiﬁer is
required to determine the public key of sender when
the ﬁle is read,
– TMS – time stamp of ﬁle creation – this value cor-
responds to the date of ﬁle creation.
Fig. 9. The structure of signature secure ﬁle.
The process of signature creation proceeds according to the
diagram shown in Fig. 8, and the structure of signature is
shown in Fig. 9.
3.3. Reading a Protected File
The process of reading of the ﬁle requires that the signa-
ture to be read before and then decrypted. These activities
are performed by the logged user (recipient of ﬁle) using
CApp. The process starts with decrypting the signature ﬁle
using the private key of the logged user, then reading time
stamp and user identiﬁer (O ID) which assumed the role the
sender creating a protected ﬁle. The time stamp protects
the encrypted ﬁle before moving it to another medium that
it was originally written on. Incompatibility of date and
time stored in the time stamp and date and time, when the
ﬁle was created, causes displaying the message and termi-
nating the procedure of ﬁle reading. Along compatibility
of the parameters, the next part of the signature is decrypt-
ing using the user public key of which identiﬁer (O ID) has
been read. The next steps of ﬁle decoding are schematically
shown in Fig. 10.
In Fig. 10, the operations performed by the EnD are
marked using thick dashed line, and the operations per-
Fig. 10. The process of data reading from an external ﬁle.
formed by the DSu are marked using the thinner line (two
dots dash).
During the data reading, the value of hash function
(HASH de) is determined. If the value HASH de is
diﬀerent from the values obtained from the signature
(HASH sig), a message is displayed and the decrypted ﬁle,
which was saved on hard disk, is being deleted.
4. Implementation Mechanisms
of Encryption/Decryption
This section presents the implementation of selected ele-
ments of drivers EnD and DSu. In particular, it describes
the pieces of code relating to the registration of the EnD
driver in the driver stack of the ﬁle system, and initiate
a logical device by the DSu driver and its associated data
structure that stores the signature components of the pro-
tected ﬁle.
4.1. Implementation the Selected Elements
of Encryption driver (EnD)
The driver registration process in the stack of ﬁle system
drivers is realized when loading it into the system by the
I/O Manager. The I/O Manager calls the DriverEntry driver
function, which will be the entry point to the driver [6]. In
this function, as the ﬁrst step shown in Fig. 11, Lookaside
list of type is initialized, in which there are held objects
representing the context of substitution data buﬀers.
In the next step, the functions made available by the ﬁlter
manager are called [4], [6]. First, the driver is registered
in the system by these functions and then ﬁltering process
is launched (Fig. 12). After registering a mini-ﬁlter using
FltRegisterFilter function, the ﬁlter manager takes over the
management of the ﬁlter.
27
Jan Chudzikiewicz and Janusz Furtak
Fig. 11. Initializing a Lookaside list.
Fig. 12. The ﬁlter registering and activating ﬁltering process.
From this moment, a mini-ﬁlter captures all messages sent
to the functional driver of ﬁle system. One of these mes-
sages may be a message about trying to mount a new vol-
ume. Then InstanceSetup function is called. This function
checks whether there is a mounted volume on a storage de-
vice connected via USB and includes the correct ﬁle sys-
tem type. If these conditions are met, the volume is con-
nected and its context2 is initialized. Otherwise, to the ﬁlter
manager is returned the STATUS FLT DO NOT ATTACH
status code, which block the connection of the mini-ﬁlter
to the volume. A piece of code referring to the previous
steps is shown in Fig. 13.
Fig. 13. Veriﬁcation of volume data.
Initiating the volume context requires allocating the neces-
sary quantity of non-paged memory, which is done by call-
ing the FltAllocateContext function. After the correct mem-
ory allocation, this function returns STATUS SUCCESS.
One should pay attention to the need to verify this value.
2The volume context is deﬁned by the volume status, which is described
in a data structure containing the properties of a volume. In this structure
the basic data about a mounted mass storage device are described.
A piece of code executing this operation is shown in
Fig. 14. If one omits this check, in case of failure of mem-
ory allocation can cause an unstable system.
Fig. 14. Appointment of the volume context.
Fig. 15. Setting the volume sector size.
For correct implementation of the operation encryp-
tion/decryption the data included in the volume context is
necessary. These data can be downloaded each time dur-
ing encryption/decryption from the volume context, but
the storage of this data in the driver structure acceler-
ates the process of encryption/decryption. Therefore, the
recommended solution is a single download of this data
by using function FltGetVolumeProperties, as it is shown
in Fig. 15.
4.2. Implementation the Selected Elements
of Supporting Driver (DSu)
In the structure of DSu driver are used drivers marked as
LEGACY DRIVER that runs in kernel mode. This solution
has been accepted because the driver doesn’t need to create
the device objects dynamically. This driver, due to the need
for communication with other components of the system,
creates one logical device object which is also used to store
base elements of signature. At the moment of loading, the
driver in the system is being called by I/O Manager the
DriverEntry that has a driver function which in the ﬁrst
step initiates an MajorFunction array. These functions will
be handled by I/O’s request addressed to the driver. A piece
of code which implements an operation of MajorFunction
array initialization is shown in Fig. 16.
Then in the DriverEntry function is being called
IoCreateDevice function which creates a device object in
the non-paged memory area. Device object is not related to
any physical device occurring in system, but is used only
28
Cryptographic Protection of Removable Media with a USB Interface for Secure Workstation for Special Applications
Fig. 16. Initializing the MajorFunction array.
Fig. 17. Initializing the device object.
as an element that stores necessary data to generate the
signature. Figure 17 shows a piece of code responsible for
creating the device object.
Fig. 18. Deﬁnition of the extension structure.
IoCreateDevice function call is preceded by a deﬁnition
of the internal name (which is functioning on the kernel
mode of system) and the symbolic name used as the refer-
ences to the driver from user mode. Veriﬁcation of correct-
ness of the device object creation is realized by checking
whether the value of status returned by the IoCreateDevice
function is equal to the value of pointer to the device ob-
ject – pDevObj. Validation of creating a device object is
achieved by checking whether the status value returned by
the function IoCreateDevice is consistent with the value of
a pointer to the device object – pDevObj. If the returned
value of status will be diﬀerent from STATUS SUCCESS
the function terminate working and returns the error code
of input/output to the parent function. After successful cre-
ation of the device object, the function returns the handle
to it, which will be then used to realize the later refer-
ences to this device. Then the initialization process of the
extension structure is realized which deﬁnition is shown
in Fig. 18.
A communication between the encryption driver (EnD)
and the driver supporting (DSu) is always initiated by
the EnD driver. The type of request directed to the driver
supporting depends on the direction of copying data,
which is initiated by the currently logged user on the
system.
4.3. Handling for Creating and Reading a Secure File
Logged user (ﬁle sender) conﬁgures the parameters of
the process of creating and reading a protected ﬁle using
CApp which window is shown in Figs. 19 and 20, respec-
tively.
Fig. 19. The window of control application CApp for write data.
First of all, the process of creating protected ﬁle requires
connection one or two (depending on where the ﬁle with
the signature will be stored) removable Flash RAM memo-
ries to a computer through USB interface. The devices are
automatically detected by EnD which transmits information
about them via the DSu to CApp.
The logged user should determine the parameters required
for encrypting the ﬁle and generating a signature. He does
this by selecting (see the Fig. 19):
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Fig. 20. The window of control application CApp for read data.
– drive in which the protected ﬁle will be stored (“Data
Drive” ﬁeld),
– drive and path to the directory in which the ﬁle with
the signature will be stored (“Signature Drive” ﬁeld),
– identiﬁer for the algorithm used to encrypt (“The en-
cryption algorithm” ﬁeld),
– identiﬁer for the algorithm used to generate hash
value for the protected ﬁle (“The Hash function al-
gorithm” ﬁeld),
– identiﬁer for user (receiver) encrypted data (“Data
Recipient” ﬁeld),
– location of public key data recipient ﬁle (“Location
of Public Key” ﬁeld).
Identiﬁer (O ID) and the private key of the sender (the
elements required to generate the signature) are automati-
cally retrieved from the system. After determining the data
conﬁguration, logged user can begin the process of copy-
ing the ﬁle using, e.g., Windows Explorer. The name of
a ﬁle which stores the signature will be concatenation of
the name of protected ﬁle and string “SIG”. The process of
creating a ﬁle with the signature is started after the encryp-
tion process is ﬁnished and, just as the encryption process,
it is invisible to the user. When the next ﬁle for the same
recipient is being encrypted it does not need to change
the conﬁguration data unless the other parameters (that is
the identiﬁer of encryption algorithm or identiﬁer of algo-
rithm generating of hash value) will be changed. Always
for the next ﬁle, a new session key will be automatically
generated.
The process of reading protected ﬁle requires a connection
to a computer through USB interface one or two (depending
on where is stored the ﬁle with the signature) removable
Flash RAM memories. The devices are automatically de-
tected by EnD which transmit information about them via
the DSu to CApp. The logged user (recipient of the data)
has to specify the drive using CApp on which encrypted
ﬁle is stored and indicate the ﬁle with the signature cor-
responding to the encrypted ﬁle. He accomplishes this by
selecting (see the Fig. 20):
– drive on which is stored the protected ﬁle (“Data
Drive” ﬁeld),
– drive and path to the directory on which is stored the
ﬁle with the signature (“Signature Drive” ﬁeld).
Other parameters required to decrypt the ﬁle are determined
based on the signature. After initializing by the logged
user, the process of copying a ﬁle EnD sends to the DSu
the name of the copied ﬁle and pauses the copy process to
the moment when are receives data required to decrypt the
ﬁle (that is the identiﬁer of encryption algorithm, session
key and identiﬁer of algorithm generating of hash value).
Based on submitted by the EnD the name of encrypted ﬁle,
DSu identiﬁes a ﬁle containing the signature and performs
the process of signature decryption and reading the conﬁgu-
ration data. Then performs the veriﬁcation process read out
TMS with the date and time of the creation of an encrypted
ﬁle. In the case of inequality of these values, message is
displayed and the ﬁle reading process is interrupted. In the
case of equality of those values, other conﬁguration data
read from the signature are passed to EnD, which resumes
the process of decryption. During the process of decrypting
the ﬁle, the EnD determines the value of a hash function
for that ﬁle. After completion of the copying process, EnD
transmit to DSu determined value of the hash function for
veriﬁcation. If the designated hash value is not equal to
the value read from the signature, a message is displayed
and the DSu deletes the ﬁle.
5. Conclusion
The SWSA uses proprietary solution for securing data on
removable Flash RAM. There have not been applied widely
available tools to secure the contents of this type of remov-
able storage media due to the fact that these solutions typi-
cally uses only symmetric encryption when writing ﬁles. In
these solutions, the key needed for encryption/decryption is
speciﬁed by the user who creates a protected ﬁle and it is
assumed that this key is known to the user when a protected
ﬁle is read. The problems associated with the transmission
of the key between the users are not taken into account.
Such a solution in the SWSA was not useful.
The solution presented in this paper is an unique and more
complicated one. The problem with the transmission of the
key does not apply users of SWSA, because they are using
the advantages of asymmetric encryption which gives as-
surance secured transfer of encryption key between parties,
involved in the exchange of data. In addition, the SWSA
uses Trusted Platform Module which supports the creation
and management of cryptographic keys.
The developed system requires the user who creates a pro-
tected ﬁle, to specify only the recipient’s ﬁle and the ﬁle
encryption parameters. The recipient of the ﬁle can only
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be the user authorized by the SWSA. The process of pro-
tecting ﬁle is closely linked with the mechanisms of sys-
temic support for removable media Flash RAM, and is
transparent to the user. When the protected ﬁle is read,
user is not burdened with any additional activities. In ad-
dition, protections are constructed in such a way that the
reading of a ﬁle is possible only by the authorized user
by the SWSA, and only with the medium on which the
ﬁle was originally saved. An attempt to copy the pro-
tected ﬁle to a diﬀerent medium locks the ability to read
the ﬁle.
The described method for protecting data on removable
Flash RAM protects data against unauthorized access in
systems processing the data, belonging to diﬀerent secu-
rity domains (with diﬀerent classiﬁcation levels) in which
channel the ﬂow of data must be strictly controlled.
The described solution protects data stored on removable
Flash RAM in case of loss or theft of the medium, but
also makes it possible to secure transfer of that data
through an unsecured transmission channel, for example
using a courier.
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